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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3011 
___________ 
 
 
MARILYN ADAMS,  
                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ZIMMER US, INC.; ZIMMER HOLDINGS, INC.;  
ZIMMER, INC.; ZIMMER SURGICAL, INC. 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civ. Action No. 5-17-cv-00621 
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith 
______________ 
 
ARGUED: April 17, 2019 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  November 20, 2019) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Pennsylvania’s discovery rule delays the start of the 
statute-of-limitations period until a plaintiff knows or 
reasonably should know she has suffered an injury caused by 
another. This appeal requires us to decide whether a reasonable 
juror could credit plaintiff Marilyn Adams’s contention that 
she reasonably did not know until February 12, 2015 that the 
hip implant made by defendant Zimmer, Inc., caused her the 
injuries for which she now sues. When Adams brought a 
defective design claim against Zimmer in February 2017, 
Zimmer contended she should have discovered her injury by 
January 2015, when she agreed to undergo hip implant revision 
surgery. The District Court accepted Zimmer’s argument and 
granted summary judgment on the ground that Adams’s claim 
was untimely under the discovery rule and two-year statute of 
limitations. In doing so, however, the District Court resolved 
issues of fact regarding the timing of Adams’s discovery that 
her hip pain was caused not by her poor adjustment to the 
implant but instead by the implant itself. Because Pennsylvania 
law delegates to a factfinder any genuine dispute over when a 
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plaintiff in Adams’s position should reasonably have 
discovered her injury, we will reverse and remand.    
 
I. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Marilyn Adams had a long and 
difficult history with hip pain.1 Adams first sought medical 
help from orthopedic surgeon Dr. Prodromos Ververeli in 
September 2010; he diagnosed her with advanced degenerative 
arthritis and recommended a total hip replacement. Dr. 
Ververeli counseled Adams that the hip replacement would last 
fifteen to twenty years, though he warned her the implant may 
wear down with use before then. Adams agreed to a hip 
replacement and Dr. Ververeli performed the procedure on 
January 18, 2011, implanting a Zimmer hip device.2  
 
Adams had no further problems with her hip for roughly 
a year and a half, but in late 2012, she started experiencing 
severe pain. Dr. Ververeli described the cause of her problems 
as “unclear” and the diagnostic process as “difficult.” App’x 
958, 228. He ran various tests attempting to identify the pain’s 
source, eventually diagnosing Adams with an infection. 
Although he warned Adams that a severe infection may require 
                                              
1 Because we review a grant of summary judgment against 
Adams, we view all facts in the light most favorable to her and 
draw reasonable inferences in her favor. See Debiec v. Cabot 
Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003). 
2 The implant is composed of several pieces, collectively 
referred to as the “Zimmer implant”: a femoral head; a “neck” 
that connects the femoral head to the stem; a stem that connects 
the neck to the femur; and a socket that facilitates implantation.  
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removing part of her hip replacement, he was able to 
successfully treat it in 2013 without removing the implant.  
 
Adams’s hip problems returned in November 2014, 
when she dislocated her hip while spending several months in 
Florida. Doctors in the emergency room there put the implant 
back in place, and Adams saw Dr. Ververeli when she returned 
home in early January 2015. Dr. Ververeli ordered various 
diagnostic tests, and an x-ray showed calcification around the 
implant. Dr. Ververeli testified he thought this abnormal result 
“could have been possibl[y] related to ongoing tissue reaction 
or a reaction to the actual dislocation event.” App’x 232. He 
ordered a CT scan, which showed a local adverse tissue 
reaction.  
 
Dr. Ververeli recommended hip revision surgery for 
Adams to replace the metal femoral head of her hip implant 
with a ceramic one. Though Adams was distraught to undergo 
hip surgery again, she consented to the operation. She went in 
for a pre-operative visit on January 30, 2015. Records from the 
visit indicate Adams was suffering from “right total hip 
metallosis,” App’x 166, which Dr. Ververeli testified is 
defined, “typically,” as “metal wear that then causes a reaction 
to the surrounding tissues”; he added the precise reaction varies 
depending on the individual patient. App’x 218. Adams 
testified she did not recall hearing about metallosis, but 
remembered being distraught over her upcoming surgery. She 
went into Dr. Ververeli’s office on February 9 to sign an 
informed consent form, which generally repeated the 
information she had been told in her pre-operative visit.  
 
Adams underwent the revision surgery on February 12, 
2015. Though Dr. Ververeli expected to replace only 
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components of the implant around the hip socket, what he 
discovered during the surgery called for a different—and much 
more drastic—revision: upon opening Adams’s hip, Dr. 
Ververeli found her muscle had largely deteriorated and metal 
debris had taken over much of the area. He discovered a 
pseudotumor roughly the size of a baseball. Rather than 
replacing the socket and implant lining, which were in fact 
largely “intact,” App’x 235, he replaced all of the main 
components of the implant hip, which had been discharging 
excessive and potentially toxic metal debris into Adams’s hip. 
Dr. Ververeli told Adams about his intraoperative findings 
after her surgery.  
 
Adams continued to experience hip pain after the 
surgery, and on February 10, 2017, she brought a product 
liability action against Zimmer.3 She alleged the implant was 
defectively designed in a way that led to “excessive fretting” 
(i.e., scraping between the pieces of the implant), corrosion, 
and metal wear debris; she further alleged Zimmer had failed 
to warn her of those risks. Zimmer moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that Adams’s claims were time-barred. 
The District Court agreed and entered summary judgment on 
statute-of-limitations grounds. Adams appeals.4  
                                              
3 Adams sued Zimmer US, Inc., Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 
Zimmer, Inc., and Zimmer Surgical, Inc. We refer to all the 
defendants collectively as “Zimmer.”  
4 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 and we have jurisdiction over Adams’s timely appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Like the District Court, we apply 
Pennsylvania law in this diversity jurisdiction case. See 
Debiec, 352 F.3d at 128. “We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same 
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II. 
A. 
In Pennsylvania, a prospective plaintiff has two years to 
bring a design defect claim like Adams’s. See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5524(2). The two-year statute of limitations generally 
begins to run “when an injury is inflicted.” Wilson v. El-Daief, 
964 A.2d 354, 361 (Pa. 2009). But “where the plaintiff’s injury 
or its cause was neither known nor reasonably ascertainable,” 
the “discovery rule” tolls the statute of limitations. Nicolaou v. 
Martin, 195 A.3d 880, 892 (Pa. 2018); Fine v. Checcio, 870 
A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005). The discovery rule accordingly 
protects parties who are reasonably unaware of latent injuries 
or suffer from injuries of unknown etiology. Nicolaou, 195 
A.3d at 892 & n.13; Fine, 870 A.2d at 858. 
 
Under the Pennsylvania discovery rule, the 
“commencement of the limitations period is grounded on 
‘inquiry notice’ that is tied to ‘actual or constructive 
knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a 
factual cause linked to another’s conduct, without the necessity 
of notice to the full extent of the injury, the fact of actual 
negligence, or precise cause.’” Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 
15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364). 
The statute of limitations accordingly begins to run when the 
plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have 
known (1) he or she was injured and (2) that the injury was 
caused by another. See Coleman v. Wyeth Pharms., 6 A.3d 502, 
                                              
standard as the district court; i.e., whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the plaintiffs.” Id. at 128 n.3.  
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510–11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). That “reasonable diligence” 
standard is an objective one, but at the same time “sufficiently 
flexible” to “take into account the differences between persons 
and their capacity to meet certain situations and the 
circumstances confronting them at the time in question.” Fine, 
870 A.2d at 858 (internal citation omitted); see also Nicolaou, 
195 A.3d at 893. Plaintiffs generally will not be charged with 
more medical knowledge than their doctors or health care 
providers have communicated to them. See Wilson, 964 A.2d 
at 365. A plaintiff bears the burden of showing her reasonable 
diligence. Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 893.  
 
“The balance struck in Pennsylvania” between the 
rights of diligent plaintiffs and defendants who should not have 
to face stale claims “has been to impose a . . . limited notice 
requirement upon the plaintiff, but to submit factual questions 
regarding that notice to the jury as fact-finder.” Gleason, 15 
A.3d at 485. “[T]hat the factual issues pertaining to Plaintiffs’ 
notice and diligence are for a jury to decide” is a “well-
established general rule” in Pennsylvania. Nicolaou, 195 A.3d 
at 894; see also Carlino v. Ethicon, Inc., 208 A.3d 92, 104 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2019). “The interplay between summary judgment 
principles and application of the discovery rule requires us to 
consider whether it is undeniably clear that [Adams] did not 
use reasonable diligence in timely ascertaining [her] injury and 
its cause, or whether an issue of genuine fact exists regarding 
[her] use of reasonable diligence to ascertain [her] injury and 
its cause.” Gleason, 15 A.3d at 486–87. If such an issue of 
diligence or notice exists, it is a jury’s role to resolve it. 
“Where, however, reasonable minds would not differ in 
finding that a party knew or should have known on the exercise 
of reasonable diligence of his injury and its cause, . . . the 
discovery rule does not apply as a matter of law.” Fine, 870 
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A.2d 858–59.  
 
B. 
The central issue in this case is whether a jury could 
conclude Adams reasonably did not discover her injury until 
February 12, 2015, when Dr. Ververeli apprised her of his 
intraoperative finding that her implant had deteriorated and 
emitted metal shards into her hip. The District Court concluded 
there can be no dispute that the information available to Adams 
in her preoperative visits would have put a reasonably diligent 
person on notice of her injury as a matter of law. In reviewing 
that determination at summary judgment we must “view the 
record and draw inferences in a light most favorable to” Adams 
as “the non-moving party.” Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 
117, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003). Doing so, we cannot conclude that 
summary judgment was appropriate. As in the several 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases before this one, the 
question “[w]hether [a plaintiff] should have acted with greater 
diligence to investigate” or otherwise should have known of 
her injury earlier “can only be seen as an issue of fact.” 
Gleason, 15 A.3d at 487.  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has paid particular 
heed to the jury’s role in determining reasonable diligence in 
medical contexts. The cause of a patient’s pain or discomfort 
can be difficult for her to identify, so courts rarely impute 
knowledge as a matter of law. The Court explained that 
principle in Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005), its 
seminal treatment of the discovery rule in the context of 
etiological uncertainty. There, Fine had experienced facial 
numbness after having his wisdom teeth extracted. His doctor 
advised him the numbness was a normal side-effect of the 
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surgery, but the numbness persisted for nearly a year. When 
Fine filed a malpractice claim about two years and one month 
after his wisdom tooth surgery, his doctor successfully 
obtained a summary judgment; the doctor defendant argued the 
limitations period began on the date of the extraction because 
Fine knew his injury—numbness—then. But the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court disagreed. It held that a reasonable jury could 
understand Fine’s numbness as “indicative of two distinct 
phenomena”—temporary side effect or permanent injury. Id. 
at 861. Because of that factual uncertainty, a jury might 
determine a reasonable person in his position neither knew nor 
should have known of his injury immediately after surgery.  
 
The Court has continued to emphasize the principle that 
diagnostic uncertainty usually creates a jury question. In 
Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354 (Pa. 2009), for instance, the 
Court held the plaintiff’s immediate suspicion of surgical error 
after surgery did not start the statutory clock as a matter of law 
because her surgeon denied error and the second opinion she 
sought suggested surgical error as only one of several possible 
explanations for her pain. Id. at 365–66. See also Gleason, 15 
A.3d at 486–87 (similar). Most recently, in Nicolaou v. Martin, 
195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018), the Court affirmed that principle: 
Nicolaou was bitten by a tick in 2001 and immediately sought 
a Lyme disease test; though her symptoms persisted, that test, 
and three others administered over the next half dozen years, 
all came back negative. She eventually saw a fifth healthcare 
provider in 2009, who diagnosed her with probable Lyme 
disease and recommended an advanced test. Nicolaou initially 
declined to pay for the test for financial reasons, but ultimately 
took it in February 2010. That test confirmed she had Lyme 
disease. The Court held that Nicolaou—who brought suit about 
two years after the February 2010 test—should be able to 
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present her case for reasonable diligence to a jury. Id. at 894–
95.  
 
Like the plaintiffs in these Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
cases, Adams has maintained that she acted with reasonable 
diligence yet did not discover her injury until February 2015. 
Adams’s claim here is that she did not know the nature of her 
injury or that it was the deterioration of the Zimmer implant, 
rather than her reaction to the implant, that was the cause. Just 
as a jury could find the plaintiff in Fine ascribed his pain to 
temporary post-operative numbness, so a jury could reasonably 
conclude Adams ascribed her pain to her own poor adjustment 
to the implant; it was only when her doctor discovered new 
information “intraoperatively” that she would know the 
implant’s disintegration, rather than her reaction to the implant, 
was causing her pain. App’x 238. 
 
To be sure, Pennsylvania’s discovery rule asks only 
when Adams knew she was injured and that her injury was 
caused by another. For the statute of limitations to start, she 
“need not know that [the] defendant’s conduct is injurious.” 
Wilson, 964 A.2d at 363. But that limitation on the 
requirements for notice was developed in order to hold 
plaintiffs to a standard of reasonable diligence: it operates to 
bar a claim where “the plaintiff has failed to exercise diligence 
in determining injury and cause by another, but has limited 
relevance in scenarios in which the plaintiff has exercised 
diligence but remains unaware of either of these factors.” Id. 
Zimmer does not dispute that Adams investigated her claim in 
coordination with Dr. Ververeli, see Oral Arg. Recording at 
26:03–26:48, and a factfinder could reasonably determine that 
Adams had exercised reasonable diligence. This strongly 
counsels against determining notice as a matter of law.  
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent further 
illustrates that while the discovery rule does not require the 
patient to have “a precise medical diagnosis” to start the statute 
of limitations, “a lay person is only charged with the 
knowledge communicated to him or her by the medical 
professionals who provided treatment and diagnosis.” 
Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 893; see also Wilson, 964 A.2d at 365. 
Adams has offered evidence that Dr. Ververeli himself did not 
know her injury and its cause until he was in the middle of 
operating on her hip in February 2015. Dr. Ververeli testified 
that his understanding of the injury and its cause fundamentally 
changed “intraoperatively,” App’x 238: he began the operation 
planning to repair and replace the socket of the implant, which 
he expected had worn down with Adams’s use, but the socket 
was in fine shape. He instead discovered the implant hip itself 
was corroding into Adams’s hip and causing her harm. Before 
that revision surgery, Dr. Ververeli expected Adams was 
adjusting poorly because “the longevity of the plastic [was] 
wearing out” around the plastic-lined socket; as to the implant 
and surrounding hip, he expected “normal appearance.” App’x 
235. But once he began operating, Dr. Ververeli realized 
Adams’s hip looked unlike the “many hip revisions [he had 
done] in [his] career.” App’x 235. He testified: “[W]hen I 
opened up Marilyn’s hip what became very abundant in this 
reaction, it almost looked like debris where her muscle should 
be as kind of replaced with this very friable, very fragile 
membrane that had a vascularity to it.” App’x 235. Having seen 
the interior of Adams’s hip, he formed the opinion that her 
“adverse local tissue reaction [was] secondary,” i.e., not caused 
by her body’s poor adjustment, but instead “a reaction to the 
[Zimmer implant].” App’x 238. He agreed that the corrosion 
and fretting that make up her injury were not, and could not, be 
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“detect[ed] until the time of the revision when the implant 
[was] visible.” App’x 241.  
 
A reasonable jury could accept Dr. Ververeli’s 
conception of the injury and cause changed during the revision 
surgery. And if Dr. Ververeli did not realize a problem with the 
implant was injuring Adams until the revision surgery, under 
Pennsylvania law Adams too cannot be charged with that 
constructive knowledge. Reasonable jurors could accordingly 
find Adams, though she knew she had trouble adjusting to her 
implant, could reasonably not have known that the implant 
itself was the cause of her injury.  
 
 In response, Zimmer points to various facts to contend 
Adams had constructive or actual knowledge of her injury. 
Though these facts are all relevant to a jury’s determination of 
knowledge and reasonable diligence, none of them support 
imputing knowledge as a matter of law.  
 
First, Zimmer asserts Adams’s awareness that the 
revision surgery would replace the Zimmer femoral head with 
another brand of implant put her on actual or constructive 
notice that the implant caused her injury. As Zimmer points 
out, Adams testified that she would have objected had her 
doctor proposed to replace the femoral head with another 
Zimmer product. See App’x 167 (Adams Deposition) (“It just 
seemed that something was wrong. It had to come out.”).5 But 
                                              
5 The Dissent finds this statement necessarily represents actual 
knowledge of injury and cause on Adams’s part. For the 
reasons discussed below, Adams’s recognition that she had a 
problem adjusting to her implant does not necessarily mean she 
knew the Zimmer device, rather than her own reaction to it, 
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Nicolaou illustrates how a plaintiff’s after-the-fact recollection 
of general suspicions does not start the statutory clock as a 
matter of law. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on 
Nicolaou’s February 2012 medical negligence claim, 
reasoning that even though a medical professional diagnosed 
her with probable Lyme disease in July 2009, a reasonable jury 
may believe she should not be charged with discovering her 
injury until February 2010, when she formally received 
positive Lyme disease test results. 195 A.3d at 884–85, 894. 
The Court reached this conclusion despite recognizing a 
Facebook post in which Nicolaou, after receiving her 2010 
diagnosis, stated she had told everyone she had Lyme disease 
“for years” and her previous doctors “ignored” her. Id. at 885, 
887. Similarly, in Wilson the plaintiff’s after-the-fact testimony 
that she knew at an earlier point “something is wrong 
here[, s]omething is really wrong” did not start the statutory 
clock as a matter of law. 964 A.2d at 358. The Court reasoned: 
“Recognizing that the testimony provides substantial support 
for Appellees’ position in the fact-finding inquiry, we conclude 
that it does not unambiguously establish notice of injury and 
cause, particularly in light of other portions of the testimony.” 
Id. at 366.  
Here, too, Adams has pointed to other parts of her 
testimony and the record that a reasonable juror could credit. 
Adams emphasizes that, like the plaintiffs in Nicolaou and 
Wilson, she had a “difficult” diagnostic history that counsels 
                                              
was the cause of her pain. We need not determine which is the 
better understanding of her statement because the only 
question for our review is whether reasonable minds could 
understand it, and the rest of the facts, differently. As the two 
opinions in this case illustrate, they could.   
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against quickly charging her with knowledge of an injury. 
App’x 228. She moreover had confronted the possibility of her 
implant being replaced once before, during her 2012–13 
struggle with infection; the implant was ultimately left in place, 
which could lead a reasonable person in her position to believe 
surgery calling for removal did not mean the device itself was 
causing her harm. Adams also asserts, and Dr. Ververeli 
confirms, that she was extremely distraught in the time leading 
up to the revision surgery, and a jury could understand her 
aversion to a Zimmer replacement in this light: she was in pain, 
so she wanted the device “to come out” without linking her 
pain to a problem with the device. App’x 167. And ultimately, 
a jury could reasonably credit her assertion that she then 
believed she had a bad reaction to the device without yet 
understanding she had an injury “caused by another party’s 
conduct.” Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 892. 
 
 Second, Zimmer contends that Dr. Ververeli, his staff, 
and various pre-surgery paperwork actually notified Adams on 
January 30, 2015 and February 9, 2015 that she was suffering 
from “metallosis” and an “adverse tissue reaction” in advance 
of the operation. Under Pennsylvania law, however, 
knowledge of medical terminology like “metallosis” and 
“adverse tissue reaction” is not sufficient to impute 
constructive knowledge. See Coleman, 6 A.3d at 518 (“[A] 
reasonable person [could] conclude that Ms. Coleman was 
confused and uncertain about the significance of the fact that 
her cancer was ‘estrogen positive.’ . . . A jury could reasonably 
find that Dr. Webb’s comment that Ms. Coleman’s breast 
cancer was ‘estrogen receptor positive’ did not constitute 
notice to her that the etiology of her cancer was the HRT 
medications.”). At any rate, Dr. Ververeli’s testimony that he 
did not know Adams had an injury caused by the implant until 
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the revision surgery shows his “metallosis” diagnosis could not 
have communicated the pertinent understanding of injury or 
cause to Adams.6  
 
While a jury may ultimately credit Zimmer’s contention 
that Adams knew or should have known about her injury at 
some point before the February 2015 revision surgery, Adams 
has raised factual issues of notice and knowledge that 
Pennsylvania law requires a jury to resolve. 
 
III. 
Because factual disputes remain concerning application 
of the discovery rule, we will reverse and remand for further 
proceedings.  
                                              
6 Zimmer also asserts that Adams’s signed surgical consent 
form from February 9, 2015 is independent evidence that she 
had actual notice of injury by that date. But because the consent 
form simply repeats the information Adams heard on her 
January 30 preoperative visit, that argument rises and falls with 
Zimmer’s other factual challenges. Like the rest of the facts it 
points to, the February 9 consent form can be presented as 
evidence to a jury but does not, as a matter of law, establish 
actual notice.  
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
 Pain is an overwhelming force in the human experience.  
When one is in pain, the predominant thoughts are: “How and 
when will this pain go away?  Just get rid of the pain!”  
Appellant Marilyn Adams (“Adams”) was sadly overwhelmed 
with right hip pain.  What was the source?  Her hip prosthesis.  
When was it apparent to her?  Unfortunately for her, days 
before she asserts—indeed, days before her hip revision 
surgery.  As such, she brought this action too late, since she 
knew of her right hip pain and its connection to the allegedly 
defective prosthesis before her surgery.  Pennsylvania’s 
discovery rule therefore does not save her cause.  Because I 
cannot steer clear of these facts, I cannot join my friends in the 
Majority.  I thus dissent.    
I. BACKGROUND 
 After Adams began experiencing right hip pain in 2008, 
she underwent total right hip replacement surgery at the hands 
of Dr. Prodromos Ververeli (“Dr. Ververeli”) on January 18, 
2011.  During the surgery, Dr. Ververeli replaced Adams’s 
natural right hip with a Zimmer M/L Taper Kinectiv Stem and 
Neck and Versys Femoral Head (the “Zimmer Device”), a hip 
prosthesis manufactured by Appellees Zimmer US, Inc.; 
Zimmer Holdings, Inc.; Zimmer, Inc.; and Zimmer Surgical, 
Inc. (collectively, “Zimmer”).  For some time after the surgery, 
Adams did well. 
 But, by September 21, 2012, Adams began 
experiencing right hip pain again.  Over the course of the next 
three years, Adams met with Dr. Ververeli several times.  After 
pursuing and eliminating several potential causes for the pain, 
Dr. Ververeli eventually concluded that she was suffering from 
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metallosis—metal wear from the Zimmer Device that was 
causing an adverse reaction to the surrounding tissue.  On 
January 30, 2015, Dr. Ververeli shared his unequivocal 
conclusion with Adams.  On that same day, Adams decided, 
based on Dr. Ververeli’s recommendation, to undergo hip 
revision surgery to replace the Zimmer Device with another hip 
prosthesis manufactured by a different company.  On February 
9, 2015, Adams signed an informed consent form for the 
surgery, which indicated that Dr. Ververeli’s final diagnosis 
was indeed metallosis. 
 Three days later, on February 12, 2015, Dr. Ververeli 
successfully performed the hip revision surgery on Adams.  
During the surgery, Dr. Ververeli replaced the Zimmer Device 
with a ceramic device manufactured by a different 
manufacturer.  The surgery corroborated Dr. Ververeli’s final 
preoperative diagnosis of metallosis, though he uncovered 
even more corrosion of the Zimmer Device during the surgery 
than he initially had imagined.  Shortly after the surgery, Dr. 
Ververeli discussed his surgical findings with Adams.  A little 
under two years later, on February 10, 2017, Adams filed the 
instant product liability action against Zimmer.  
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II. PENNSYLVANIA’S DISCOVERY RULE1 
 As the Majority correctly notes, Pennsylvania law 
proscribes a two-year statute of limitations on the claims before 
us.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).  Although the two-year 
period typically begins to run once an injured party suffers an 
injury, see Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 2005), the 
discovery rule provides a limited exception, tolling the statute 
of limitations in certain cases involving latent injury or an 
inapparent causal connection, see Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 
354, 361 (Pa. 2009).   
 But, even in such cases, Pennsylvania’s discovery rule 
only tolls the statute of limitations until the injured party has 
“actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form [(1)] 
of significant harm and [(2)] of a factual cause linked to 
another’s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full 
extent of the injury, the fact of actual negligence, or precise 
cause.”  Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 
2011) (quoting Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364); see Debiec v. Cabot 
Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 132 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that an 
“unrebutted suspicion” of an injury caused by another is 
sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations in Pennsylvania).  
The injured party also need not know “the precise medical 
cause of her injury,” that “her physician was negligent,” or that 
                                              
1 Since this case arises under diversity jurisdiction, we apply 
Pennsylvania substantive law.  Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), our task is thus to predict how the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule if it were deciding 
this case.  See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 
86, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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“she has a cause of action” for the limitations period to begin.  
Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364 n.10 (citations omitted).   
 Importantly, Pennsylvania intentionally crafted its 
discovery rule to be narrow, placing a heavy burden on the 
injured party invoking the rule.  See id. at 364 (reviewing the 
two major “approaches to determining accrual for limitations 
purposes” in other jurisdictions and formulating its own 
discovery rule to reflect the “narrower” one); see also Gleason, 
15 A.3d at 484 (“Pennsylvania’s formulation of the discovery 
rule reflects a narrow approach ‘to determining accrual for 
limitations purposes’ and places a greater burden upon 
Pennsylvania plaintiffs vis-á-vis the discovery rule than most 
other jurisdictions.” (citing Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364)).   
 The injured party thus bears the burden of proof.  
Wilson, 964 A.2d at 362.  To toll the statute of limitations, the 
injured party must demonstrate that, even through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, she was unable to determine that she 
suffered an injury that was causally linked to the conduct of 
another.  See Cochran v. GAF Corp., 666 A.2d 245, 250 (Pa. 
1995).  Reasonable diligence requires the injured party to 
exhibit “those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence[,] 
and judgment which society requires of its members for the 
protection of their own interest and the interest of others.”  
Fine, 870 A.2d at 858 (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 
A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)).   
 Indeed, determining when the injured party knew or 
should have known that she was injured by another party’s 
conduct is a fact-intensive inquiry ordinarily for a jury to 
decide.  Wilson, 964 A.2d at 362.  But the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has importantly noted that “courts may resolve 
the matter at the summary judgment stage where reasonable 
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minds could not differ on the subject.”  Id. (citing Fine, 870 
A.2d at 858–59, and Cochran, 666 A.2d at 248).    
III. THE MAJORITY’S MISSTEPS 
 Since Adams filed this lawsuit on February 10, 2017, 
her claims are only timely if they accrued on or after February 
10, 2015.  In my view, the District Court correctly determined 
that Adams’s claims accrued as a matter of law by January 30, 
2015—when Dr. Ververeli informed Adams she was 
experiencing metallosis from the Zimmer Device.2  Today, in 
holding that factual issues bar summary judgment, the Majority 
errs in three chief respects: (A) it overlooks or undervalues 
undisputed material facts, (B) it misapplies the appropriate 
legal standard, and (C) it relies on inapposite cases.  I address 
each error in turn.  
A. Oversight of Undisputed Material Facts 
 The Majority erroneously concludes that reasonable 
minds could disagree as to when the statute of limitations 
began chiefly by overlooking material facts.  Most damningly, 
Adams admitted in her deposition that she knew by January 30, 
2015 that her injury was causally linked to the Zimmer Device.  
When asked about her state of mind on that date when Dr. 
Ververeli recommended that the Zimmer Device be replaced, 
Adams responded: “It just seemed that something was wrong.  
[The Zimmer Device] had to come out. . . . It was a problem.”  
App. 167.  Inherent to her concession that she knew then that 
                                              
2 Indeed, this certainly more than meets the “unrebutted 
suspicion” standard our jurisprudence reflects.  Debiec, 352 
F.3d at 132. 
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there was a problem with the Zimmer Device that required its 
removal is the notion that she connected her injury to Zimmer’s 
conduct.  That is all the second element of Pennsylvania’s 
narrow discovery rule demands.  See Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484 
(requiring only knowledge of “some form . . . of a factual cause 
linked to another’s conduct, without necessity of notice of the 
. . . precise cause” (citation omitted)).  By her own words, then, 
Adams confirmed that she satisfied this element, thereby 
beginning the statute of limitations, on January 30, 2015.  On 
its own, this concession is game, set, and match.    
 How, then, does the Majority conclude that reasonable 
minds could disagree about when the statute of limitations 
began to run?  First, the Majority attempts to undermine the 
dispositive nature of Adams’s concession by chopping it up 
and unreasonably focusing on a mere portion of it in isolation.  
See Maj. Op. 13 & n.5 (curiously omitting any mention of 
Adams’s testimony that she knew on January 30, 2015 that the 
Zimmer Device itself was a problem).   
 Then, and more broadly, the Majority harps at length on 
what are ultimately immaterial facts.  For example, the 
Majority asserts that Adams’s testimony that she would have 
objected had Dr. Ververeli proposed to replace the Zimmer 
Device with another Zimmer product, see App. 167, does not 
definitively mean she knew that the Zimmer Device caused her 
injury.  See Maj. Op. 13–14.  But that is beside the point.  In 
light of Adams’s concession from moments prior to that 
testimony, it does not matter whether or why she wanted to 
replace the Zimmer Device with another manufacturer’s 
product.  Indeed, by the time Adams made this comment, she 
had already admitted that on January 30, 2015 she knew there 
was a problem with the Zimmer Device that was causing her 
pain and thus required its removal.  That conceded knowledge 
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is more than sufficient for her claims to have accrued on that 
date.  Reasonable minds could not disagree.  
 The Majority also dwells over whether Dr. Ververeli 
clearly explained to Adams that his final diagnosis of 
metallosis indicated some connection between her injury and 
the Zimmer Device.  See id. at 15 (stating that knowledge of 
medical terminology “is not sufficient to impute constructive 
knowledge” (citation omitted)).  But this is both immaterial, 
considering Adams’s concession, and incorrect, since Dr. 
Ververeli indeed informed Adams that his metallosis diagnosis 
implicated the Zimmer Device as the cause of her right hip 
pain.  During his deposition, Dr. Ververeli defined “metallosis” 
as being “metal wear that then causes a reaction to the 
surrounding tissues.”  App. 218.  He further clarified that, by 
January 30, 2015, he had not only informed Adams about the 
metallosis diagnosis, but also explained that this meant she was 
suffering from “adverse local tissue reaction from wear and 
fretting to the [Zimmer Device],” which would necessitate 
“revision [surgery] and chang[ing the Zimmer Device to a 
prosthesis with a] ceramic head” to “correct the problem.”  Id. 
at 256–57.3  By January 30, 2015, then, Adams had actual or 
                                              
3 Adams’s deposition testimony creates no doubt as to Dr. 
Ververeli’s testimony.  When asked whether Dr. Ververeli 
notified her on January 30, 2015 that she was experiencing 
metallosis, for example, Adams responded that she “[did not] 
remember.”  Id. at 166.  Lack of memory, however, does not 
establish a genuine dispute at this summary judgment stage.  
Cf. Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 333 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  In any event, Adams’s inability to recall some 
things does not undermine her damning concession discussed 
previously.   
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constructive knowledge that her right hip pain was a reaction 
to—and thus being caused, at least in part, by—the presence of 
the Zimmer Device, thereby triggering the statute of 
limitations.     
 Further, whether Adams’s prior diagnostic history was 
“unclear” or “difficult,” as the Majority characterizes it, e.g., 
Maj. Op. 4 (citation omitted), is of no moment.  Why?  That is 
because, by January 30, 2015, Dr. Ververeli had meticulously 
eliminated all other potential diagnoses through various tests, 
scans, and procedures and given Adams a single, unequivocal 
diagnosis of metallosis.  See App. 258.  By that point, not only 
was Dr. Ververeli’s diagnosis clear, but it was also correct, as 
the findings during the surgery further supported.   
 Finally, that the revision surgery uncovered even more 
corrosion from the Zimmer Device than initially anticipated is 
also of no significance because the surgery still only 
corroborated Dr. Ververeli’s preoperative diagnosis that 
Adams’s pain was originating from a reaction to the metal in 
the Zimmer Device.  Indeed, as discussed more fully later, 
Pennsylvania law explicitly instructs us not to consider in our 
analysis the extent of Adams’s injury, which undoubtedly 
corresponds to the extent of the metal wear uncovered in her 
surgery.  See Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484.  In sum, then, Adams’s 
claims accrued by January 30, 2015, by which point even she 
concedes that she knew that her injury was causally linked to 
Zimmer’s conduct.  All reasonable minds properly viewing all 
of the undisputed, material facts would have to agree.     
B. Misapplication of Legal Standard 
 In applying the relevant legal standard, the Majority 
inappropriately heightens the bar for when the statute of 
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limitations is triggered under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule.  In 
doing so, it primarily violates two central principles outlined 
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: for claims to accrue 
under the discovery rule, an injured party (1) need only know 
about some form of significant harm, not the full extent of her 
injury; and (2) need only know about a causal link between her 
injury and another’s conduct, not misconduct.  
1. Some Form of Significant Harm, Not Full Extent of Injury 
 Much of the Majority’s position rests on its claim that 
Dr. Ververeli did not fully appreciate the Zimmer Device’s 
deterioration until he was in the midst of Adams’s surgery.  But 
the Majority’s attempt to characterize Dr. Ververeli’s 
preoperative diagnosis and postoperative knowledge as being 
“fundamentally” different, Maj. Op. 12, cannot save the day. 
 That is because the surgery simply verified Dr. 
Ververeli’s prior diagnosis.  If anything, during the surgery, 
Dr. Ververeli only discovered corrosion of the Zimmer Device, 
and resulting adverse reactions in Adams’s nearby muscle 
tissue, beyond that which he was already expecting and had 
parlayed to Adams.  See App. 235 (Dr. Ververeli’s stating that 
his surgery revealed “abundant . . . reaction” to the extensive 
corrosion of the Zimmer Device in Adams’s nearby “soft 
tissue”).  That, however, is of no moment in our analysis 
because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania instructs us to only 
consider whether an injured party has notice of “at least some 
form of significant harm,” not “the full extent of the injury.”  
Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484 (quoting Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364).  
Here, Adams had such notice before the surgery given Dr. 
Ververeli’s correct preoperative diagnosis. 
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 Relatedly, to the extent the Majority asserts that Dr. 
Ververeli’s preoperative diagnosis was somehow incorrect due 
to the extensive corrosion he uncovered during Adams’s 
surgery, that, too, is irrelevant.  That is because Pennsylvania’s 
discovery rule only requires that an injured party know of 
“some form of . . . factual cause link[ing her injury] to 
another’s conduct,” not “the precise medical cause of her 
injury.”  Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364 & n.10 (citations omitted).  
At core, whether Dr. Ververeli made new discoveries while 
conducting Adams’s surgery, his preoperative diagnosis of 
metallosis—metal wear that causes a reaction to the 
surrounding tissues—still correctly put Adams on notice that 
her injury was causally connected to the Zimmer Device—the 
only metal in her right hip.  That is all Adams needed to know 
to satisfy the discovery rule’s second element. 4 
 Perhaps unintentionally, even the Majority admits that 
the crux of Dr. Ververeli’s new findings during the surgery was 
merely that the Zimmer Device was corroding even more than 
previously imagined.  See Maj. Op. 12 (stating that Dr. 
Ververeli “began the operation . . . expect[ing that the socket 
of the Zimmer Device] had worn down . . . but [also] 
discovered the [Zimmer Device] itself was corroding”).  In 
fact, Adams also concedes this.  See Appellant’s Br. 32 (stating 
                                              
4 The Majority’s obsession with the “debris” Dr. Ververeli 
found during the revision surgery is likewise misplaced 
because Dr. Ververeli has clarified that “fretting and metal 
wear debris . . . are very similar,” as they are both “types of 
corrosion,” which he already expected before the surgery.  
App. 218.  By focusing on this, then, the Majority is simply on 
an intellectual—but ultimately irrelevant—frolic.      
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that, during the surgery, Dr. Ververeli saw “a lot more [tissue] 
reaction” than he expected (citation omitted)).   
 Dr. Ververeli’s own testimony crystallizes this point.  
During his deposition, Dr. Ververeli confirmed that, “[p]rior to 
conducting th[e] revision surgery,” his “definitive diagnosis” 
was that Adams was “suffering from an adverse local tissue 
reaction to the [Zimmer Device],” which he had previously 
defined as metallosis.  App. 238.  When also asked whether, 
“after [he] performed th[e] revision procedure . . . [he] was able 
to formulate [the] opinion as to whether . . . Adams was 
suffering from an adverse local tissue reaction,” he answered 
in the affirmative.  Id.  In other words, the surgery just 
confirmed what Dr. Ververeli predicted, and expressed to 
Adams, before the surgery. 
 In sum, then, the undisputed material facts before us 
demonstrate that Dr. Ververeli’s preoperative diagnosis 
remained unchanged after Adams’s surgery.  The only new 
intraoperative discovery was the extent to which the Zimmer 
Device corroded and Adams’s nearby muscle tissue had thus 
adversely reacted.  Hence, by hanging its hat on developments 
that merely go to “the full extent of [Adams’s] injury,” the 
Majority flouts Pennsylvania law.  Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484 
(quoting Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364).   
2. Causal Link Between Injury and Another’s Conduct, Not 
Misconduct 
 The Majority also errs in that it inappropriately focuses 
on whether Adams knew that the Zimmer Device was flawed 
in some respect.  Most strikingly, the Majority’s own words 
indicate that its analysis turns on whether Adams, through Dr. 
Ververeli, “realize[d] a problem with the [Zimmer Device] was 
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injuring” her.  Maj. Op. 13.  But that is not what Pennsylvania’s 
discovery rule demands for claims to accrue.  Instead, the 
discovery rule hinges on whether the injured party has 
knowledge of a causal link between her injury and “another 
party’s conduct,” not misconduct—i.e., negligence.  Gleason, 
15 A.3d at 484 (quoting Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364).  Put 
differently, the question is not whether Adams was on notice 
of a problem with the Zimmer Device—i.e., a design defect—
but rather whether she was on notice of her problem—her right 
hip pain—relating to the Zimmer Device.  Here, she was.   
 Even the Majority concedes this articulation of the legal 
standard.  See Maj. Op. 11 (“For the statute of limitations to 
start, [Adams] ‘need not know that [the] defendant’s conduct 
is injurious.’” (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)); see also, e.g., Wilson, 964 A.2d at 362 (“[T]he fact 
that a plaintiff is not aware that the defendant’s conduct is 
wrongful, injurious[,] or legally actionable is irrelevant to the 
discovery rule analysis[.]” (citing Burton–Lister v. Siegel, 
Sivitz and Lebed Assoc., 798 A.2d 231, 237 (Pa. Super. 2002)).  
But the Majority nonetheless corrupts the standard in its 
application. 
 In particular, the Majority attempts to use the reasonable 
diligence requirement as a sword that somehow pierces 
Pennsylvania’s binding and timeworn articulation of the 
discovery rule.  As the Majority apparently sees it, that “a 
factfinder could reasonably determine that Adams had 
exercised reasonable diligence . . . strongly counsels against 
determining notice as a matter of law.”  Maj. Op. 11.  The 
Majority reaches this erroneous conclusion because, in 
explaining the rationale behind the reasonable diligence 
requirement, one case once mentioned that the rule that a 
plaintiff need not know that the defendant’s conduct was 
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wrongful “has limited relevance in scenarios in which the 
plaintiff has exercised diligence but remains unaware of [the 
injury and causation] factors.”  Maj. Op. 11 (citation omitted).  
 But this reasonable diligence discussion is a red herring 
here.  By its plain terms, the language the Majority cites only 
contemplates a plaintiff’s diligence possibly alleviating 
application of the discovery rule’s causation element where, 
despite her diligence, she remains unaware of the causal link 
between her injury and the defendant’s conduct.  Adams, 
however, had such knowledge here, evidenced chiefly by her 
admission that she knew by January 30, 2015 that the Zimmer 
Device “was a problem” and thus “had to come out” of her 
right hip.  App. 167.  Thus, that Adams may have investigated 
her claim with reasonable diligence does not “strongly 
counsel[] against determining notice as a matter of law,” as the 
Majority erroneously concludes.  Maj. Op. 11.  Instead, 
whether Adams was reasonably diligent has no bearing on this 
particular analysis because, by the time of her surgery, she had 
satisfied both elements of Pennsylvania’s discovery rule, thus 
triggering the statute of limitations.  
C. Reliance on Inapposite Cases 
 Finally, the Majority erroneously relies on cases 
inapplicable here.  In asserting that this case must go to a jury, 
the Majority gloms onto an array of cases also sent to juries—
but none of which are analogous to ours.  That is because those 
cases involved (1) multiple or uncertain causes or (2) incorrect 
diagnoses.  By contrast, Dr. Ververeli here had given Adams a 
single, correct diagnosis for her injury by January 30, 2015.    
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1. Multiple or Uncertain Causes 
 The Majority supports its proclamation that “diagnostic 
uncertainty usually creates a jury question” by turning to a 
handful of cases, including Fine, Wilson, Gleason, and Carlino 
v. Ethicon, Inc., 208 A.3d 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).  Maj. Op. 
10.  But each of those cases concerned plaintiffs who were 
given multiple or uncertain causes for their injuries by their 
medical providers.  See Fine, 870 A.2d at 861; Wilson, 964 
A.2d at 365; Gleason, 15 A.3d at 487; Carlino, 208 A.3d at 
106.  Although the Majority properly notes that Adams 
previously had a “difficult diagnostic history,” Maj. Op. 14 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), by the time of 
Adams’s January 30, 2015 office visit, Dr. Ververeli had 
thoroughly eliminated all of the other potential causes for her 
injury and given her a single, unequivocal diagnosis of 
metallosis, see App. 258 (Dr. Ververeli’s affirming that on 
“January 30, 2015” he “confirmed that [Adams] was suffering 
from metallosis”).  As a result, Fine, Wilson, Gleason, and 
Carlino are all inapposite.   
2. Incorrect Diagnoses 
 Lastly, the Majority’s reliance on Nicolaou v. Martin, 
195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018), is misplaced for at least two reasons.  
First, and most notably, unlike the many incorrect diagnoses 
the plaintiff in Nicolaou had previously received, id. at 895, 
Dr. Ververeli’s final preoperative diagnosis of metallosis was 
correct.  Second, prior to receiving the positive test result that 
verified her malady, the Nicolaou plaintiff had only received a 
“probable”—not final—diagnosis from her medical provider.  
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Id. at 884.5  Here, in contrast, Dr. Ververeli “confirmed” to 
Adams on January 30, 2015 “that she was suffering from 
metallosis.”  App. 258.  The correct, final nature of Dr. 
Ververeli’s diagnosis critically distinguishes it from the 
Nicolaou medical provider’s “probable” diagnosis.  Nicolaou, 
195 A.3d at 884.  These two features render Nicolaou 
inapplicable to our case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 While our legal system aims to give all their day in 
court, a plaintiff must comply with the rules.  Here, any 
sympathies for her properly put aside, Adams did not.  The 
undisputed material facts indicate that her claims are time-
barred by Pennsylvania’s applicable statute of limitations.  
Even drawing all inferences in Adams’s favor, no reasonable 
mind could conclude otherwise.  I thus dissent.   
                                              
5 That correct diagnosis only became final when the plaintiff 
received the positive test result.  Importantly, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania never questioned that, even under the 
discovery rule, the Nicolaou plaintiff’s claims would have 
accrued at the latest when she received the correct, final 
diagnosis of her disease.  
 
